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\ [L. A. No. 28185. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1965.] I 
CREST CATERING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE SU- I, 
PERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Re-
spondent; CARL KIRSTEN, Real Party in Interest. II 
[1] Discovery-l1nder Statutory Procedures-Privileged Matters. 
-Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 1094, 2111, providing that information 
furnished to the Department of Employment by an employing 
nnit shall not be open to the public or admissible in evidence 
in any action or special proceeding, manifest a clear legislative 
purpose to preserve the confidentiality of information sub-
mitted to the Department of Employment. 
[2] Id.-l1nder Statutory Procedures-Privileged Matters.-Un-
emp. Ins. Code, §§ 1094, 2111, providing that information fur-
nished to the Department of Employment by an employing unit 
shall not be open to the public or admissible in evidence in any 
action or special proceeding, not only make such material 
privileged at a trial, but also make it immune from discovery 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Discovery, Inspection, Mental and Physical 
Examination, § 5; Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection (rev. ed. 
§§ 15-17). 
McX. Dig. References: [1-3] Discovery, § 7; [4] Waiver, §§ 4,5 • 
.. 
-) 
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(62 C.2<I 2'14; 42 Cal.Rptr. 110. 388 P.2<I 150] 
in view of Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (b), making matters 
privileged against disclosure at a trial likewise privileged 
against disclosure through any discovery procedure. 
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Under Statutory Procedures-Privileged Matters-
Waiver.-An employer waived its privilege against disclosure 
of its employment tax returns under discovery proceedings, 
instituted by the administrator of an employee welfare and 
retirement fund to. aseertain the eorrect amount due to the 
fund by the employer, by becoming bound by a welfare fund 
trust agreement providing that the employer shall promptly 
furnish all necessary information on demand to those entrusted 
with the operation and administration of the fund, where 
inspeetion of the tax returns was made necessary by the 
destruction by fire of the employer's payroll reeords, and 
where the employer, during audits of the fund for other years, 
opened its books and records, ineluding in one instance eopies 
of its employment tax returns, for audit and inspection by 
the fund administrator. 
[4] Waiver-Requisites-ltnowledge and Intent: Acts Constitut-
iDg.-A waiver may occur by an intentional relinquishment or 
as the result of an act which, according to its natural import, 
is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to 
induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to prohibit the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County and Philbrick McCoy~ Judge 
thereof, from enforcing an order to produce for inspection 
copies of quarterly employment tax returns. Alternative writ 
discharged and peremptory writ denied. 
Epport & Delevie and Victor M. Epport for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward M. Belasco 
and Herschel T. Elkins, Deputy Attorneys General, Mitchell, 
Silberberg & Knupp and Howard S. Smith as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
James H. De~ison and Edward S. Stutman for Real Party in 
Interest. 
, 
Harry Graham Balter, Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson 
& Rogers and Robert A. Seligson as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Real Party in Interest. 
[4] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Waiver, § 3; Am.Jur., Waiver (1st ed §§ 14, 
15). 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Carl Kirsten, as administrator of·. 
Employee Welfare and Retirement Fund and as assignee 
the trustees of the fund, brought an action against 
Catering Company to compel payment of contributions .. ~''' .. -'''' 
edly owed to the fund under the terms of a contract with a 
labor union. He alleged that in June 1957 Crest orally agreed, 
with the union to make contributions to the fund at' specified 
hourly rates for each hour worked by each of its employees and' 
to be bound by the terms of certain trust instruments estab-
lishing the fund. He also alleged that Crest failed to make 
a full and complete accounting of its indebtedness under the 
contract. 
During discovery proceedings, Kirsten directed interroga-
tories to Crest as to the number of employees and the hours 
worked by each during the period in issue in order to ascertain 
the correct amount due under the alleged contract. When 
Crest responded that all its books and records had been de-
stroyed by fire. Kirsten suggested that Crest obtain the re-
quested information from copies of its employment tax re-
turns. The completeness and accuracy of Crest's answers to 
several sets of interrogatories became the subject of a sharp 
and acrimonious dispute. On Kirsten's motion the court 
ordered Crest to produce for inspection copies of its quarterly 
returns submitted to the California State Department of Em-
ployment and to the federal agencies. Crest then filed this peti-
tion for a writ to prohibit enforcement of the order on the 
ground that copies of its employment tax returns filed with 
the Department of Employment are privileged under sections 
1094 and 2111 of the Unemployment Insurance Code.1 
Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a 
party may be ordered to produce for inspection "any desig-
nated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, 
objects or tangible things, not privileged . .. " which relate to 
pending litigation. (Italics added.) 
With exceptions not here relevant, section 1094 of the 
Unemployment Insurance Code provides that the information 
deliveted to the Department of Employment by an employing 
unit "shall be for the exclusive use and information of the 
lIt is not contended that the information submitted to the federal 
agencies would be privileged under federal law. (See cases cited in 70 
A.L.R.2d 237 at pp. 244 and 246.) In Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957) 
49 Cal.2d 509, 513·514 [319 P.2d 621J, however, we refused to permit in· 
spection of federal tax returns if the information contained therein would 
be deemcd privileged under state law. Accordingly, the propriety of the 
discovery order as it relates to the fedcrnl returns depends upon whether 
it would impinge on the privilege with respect to state returns. 
Jan. 1965] CREST CATERING CO. 'I). SUPERIOR COURT 277 
f82 C.2d 274: 42 Cal.Rptr. lID, 388 P.2d 1501 
director ... and shall not be open to the public, nor admissible 
in evidence in any action or special proceeding ..•. " Section 
2111 provides that the information .. is confidential and shall 
not be published or open to public inspection in any manner 
... " and declares that any employee of the department who 
violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
[1] These provisions manifest a clear legislative purpose 
to preserve tIle confidentiality of information submitted to the 
Department of Employment. (See Webb v. Standard Oil Co. 
(1957) 49 Ca1.2d 509, 513 [319 P.2d 621].) 
Amici curiae contend that we should re-examine the holding 
in the Webb case in the ligllt of St. Regis Paper Co. v. United 
States (1961) 368 U.S. 208, 218 [82 S.Ct. 289, 7 L.Ed.2d 240], 
which held that statutes substantially tIle same as those con-
sidered in the Webb case did not create a privilege. Following 
the St. Regis case, however, Congress amended the relevant 
statutes to abrogate the rule of that ease. Moreover, unlike 
the statutes considered in the Webb ease,' sections 1094 and 
2111 leave no room for doubt that they create a privilege. In-
deed, in the St. Regis opinion itself, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that statutes similar to sections 1094 and 2111 
created a privilege. (368 U.S. at p. 218.) We are therefore not 
persuaded that we should re-examine the holding in the Webb 
case. 
[2] There is also no merit in Kirsten's contention that 
tht>-se sections do not make the information immune from dis-
covery but merely make it privileged at the trial. Section 
2016, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly 
provides that "All matters which are privileged against 
disclosure upon the trial under the law of this State are 
privileged against disclosure through any discovery pro-
cedure .... '0 
[3a] We agree, however, with Kirsten '8 contention that 
Crest waived its right to assert the privilege. 
In its contract with the union, Crest agreed to be bound 
'In Webb v. Standard Oil 00. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509 [819 P.2d 621], we 
were ealled upon to interpret sections 19282 and 19283 of the Revenue 
and Taxatioh Code. Section 19282 provides: •• Except as otherwise pro-
vided . . . it is a misdemeanor for the Franchise .Tax Board, nny 
deputy, agent, clerk, or other offieer or employee, to disclose in any 
manner information as to the a'mount of ineome or any particulars set 
forth or disclosed in any report or return required under this part." 
Section 19283 provides: .. Such infommtioll may be disclosed in accord-
ance with proper judicial order in cases or actions instituted for the 
enforcement of this pnrt or for the prosecution of violations of this 
pa.rt. o, 
) 
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by the trust agreement that governs the WeHare and 
ment Fund. Section 4.07 of that agreement provides: 4, Each· 
employer covered hereby shall assist in the preparation and 
cooperate in the execution of any and all forms, applications 
or other data necessary in the establishment and operation of ... 
the Plan and Fund, and in this connection shall promptly t_r. 
nish all necessary information _pon demand to the Trustees 
or the Administrator entrusted with the operation and ad. 
ministration of the Plan and Fund. " (Italics added.)· Section 
4.08 provides: "To facilitate the Trustees' determination of 
full and complete reporting, the Trustees may, within their 
discretion, assign an auditor at the expense of the Fund (and 
not at the expense of either the Employers' Council or the 
Union) to audit the payrolls for the sole purpose of determin. 
ing the correct amount of contributions owed the Funds ..•. " 
Crest contends that the foregoing provisions do not waive 
the privilege because there is no specific reference either to the 
code provisions creating the privilege or to the tax returns. 
A waiver does not depend upon meeting such a brittle require-
ment. In Torbensen v. Family Life Insurance Co. (1958) 163 
Cal.App.2d 401, 404 [329 P.2d 596], the court was called upon 
to determine whether a clause in an application for a life in-
1;urance policy operated to waive the doctor-patient privilege. 
The clause in question stated: 4' To whom it may concern: 
I hereby authorize and request you to disclose any and all 
information and records concerning my condition when under 
observation by you, if requested to do so" by the life insurance 
company. Even though no reference was made either to the 
particular code provision involved or to the particular privilege 
involved, the court found that the applicant waived the 
privilege. 
[4] A waiver may occur (1) by an intentional relinquish-
ment or (2) as "the result of an act which, according to its 
natural import, is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the 
right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been 
relinquished." (Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States (1962) 57 
Ca1.2d 621, 626 [21 Cal.Rptr. 802, 371 P.2d 578].) 
. [3b] Crest's promise to "!urnish all necessary information 
upon demapd" meets the first test enunciated in the Rheem 
case. Although the employment tax returns might not be 
classified as 4' necessary information" were the payrolls avail-
able, the destruction of the payrolls left the tax returns as the 
only source of the information required to be furnished by the 
trust agreement. Inspection of copies of the tax returns is 
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clearly •• necessary" under these circumstances. Crest proposes 
that we interpret section 4.07 of the trust agreement as re-
quiring it to furnish all necessary information unIe88 the same 
be privileged. The language of section 4.07, however, is clear 
and explicit and does not limit Crest's obligation. 
Furthermore, Crest's actions during two prior audits for 
other years not only illustrate its awareness of the broad scope 
of section 4.07, but meet the second test enunciated in the 
Bheem case. On those occasions Crest opened its books and 
records, including in one instance copies of its employment 
tax returns, for audit and inspection by Kirsten and made 
substantial payments found to be owing as a result of those 
audits. . 
The conclusion that Crest waived the privilege is buttressed 
by the fact that the payrolls and the tax returns contain 
basically the same information. Had Crest's payrolls not been 
destroyed by tire, no claim of privilege could have been raised 
to prevent Kirsten from invoking his rights under section 4.08 
to obtain access to those records. The same information does 
not become less obtainable merely because it is written on a 
governmental form. (ToZlefsen v. Phillips (D.C. Mass. 1954) 
16 F.R.D. 348, 349. See also Connecticut Importing Co. v. 
ContinentaZ Distilling Corp. (D.C. Conn. 1940) 1 F.R.D. 190, 
192; Paramount Film Distnouting Corp. v. Bam, (D.C. E.D. 
8.C.1950) 91 F.Supp. 778, 781; and Beetlesv. Pennsylvania B. 
Co. (D.C. Del. 1948) 80 F.Supp. 107, 108-109; (keyhound 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 355, 397 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 
364 P.2d 266].) 
The alternative writ is discharged, and the peremptory writ 
is denied. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J. and Burke, J., 
concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would grant the writ of prohibi-
tion for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Herndon in the 
opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal 
(Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court (Cal.App.) 40 Cal. 
Rptr.588). , 
